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Abstract: This article explores if and how national elections affect the chances of 
concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature on about the 
informational efficiency of elections, we are interested in how political uncertainty in the 
run up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case 
of decision-making in the European Union (EU), we find that pending national elections 
significantly reduce the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level, that 
this effect is strongest during close elections with uncertain outcomes, and that it is 
particularly pronounced in the case of elections in larger member states. Our findings 
highlight the fruitfulness of further research into the dynamics between national and 
international politics. The article has positive and normative implications for the literature 
on two-level games, international negotiations, and legislative bargaining in the EU. 
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Introduction 
Just ahead of the 2013 elections to the German Bundestag, the Irish presidency of the 
EU’s Council of Ministers postponed the negotiation of new emission limits for cars only 
to adopt them soon after the reelection of Chancellor Merkel. According to the German 
news magazine Der Spiegel, this decision, amongst others, resulted from a “systematic 
slowdown” of EU negotiations as a consequence of the German federal elections.1 
Similar stories exist in other contexts as well. In the US, presidential elections are said to 
have stalled progress in international peace talks and trade negotiations, while 
congressional midterm elections may have led to the postponement of important 
international climate deals.2 
Do these anecdotes reflect a general phenomenon? Are the chances of reaching an 
international agreement significantly lower during national election campaigns? In view 
of the paramount importance of pending elections to the dynamics of national politics, as 
described in the comparative politics literature,3 there is surprisingly little theory and 
evidence of this phenomenon with respect to international politics. Whilst the relevance 
of domestic variables for international politics is hardly disputed, scholars predominantly 
look at national elections as static factors to explore, for example, the effect of different 
electoral systems on foreign policy preferences or the impact of leadership turnover on 
cooperation outcomes. The questions of if and how pending national elections impact the 
dynamics of international politics have yet to be answered. 
                                                
1 Der Spiegel 2013. 
2 Goldenberg 2014. 
3 Franzese 2002. 
Judging from the studies (reviewed below) that exist on this topic, the causal effect of 
pending national elections on international politics is ambiguous at best. Following the 
logic of political budget cycle models, some scholars argue that elections create 
incentives for governments to advance international agreements that will allow them to 
appear competent to voters and postpone those agreements expected to have the opposite 
effect. Studies following the logic of two-level games suggest that incumbents have 
conflicting incentives to advance or stall international negotiations depending on the 
election’s expected impact on their international bargaining power. Both models remain 
indeterminate insofar as a government’s incentives for the advancement or postponement 
of a decision depend on a variety of scope conditions. They are incomplete in that neither 
model explains under what conditions the government’s negotiating partners would allow 
for the deliberations to be manipulated in one way or the other. 
Although insightful, we suspect that a focus on voter preferences and the impending 
election outcome obfuscates a more systematic, and potentially more important aspect, of 
national elections. It is the defining feature of democracies as “systems of organized 
uncertainty” that, at the point that parties announce their programs, nobody can know for 
sure whether or not there will be a change in leadership and policy.4 We conjecture that 
this political uncertainty, which we approximate with the closeness of an electoral race, 
impacts international negotiations by creating incentives for the incumbent to remain 
ambiguous even on seemingly innocuous topics. Negotiations get bogged down as 
growing political uncertainty makes incumbents increasingly unwilling to take a clear 
stance at the international level that might contradict her electoral stance at home. Given 
                                                
4 Przeworski 1991, 13. This does not mean that candidates and voters are not aware of the probabilities of 
winning, but they do not know if they will win or lose. 
that large states tend to be more essential for the conclusion of most international 
agreements, we further conjecture that this effect is stronger in the case of elections in 
large states than in small states. 
We explore these conjectures using the case of decision-making in the EU. The EU turns 
out to be an ideal laboratory for our purpose. As a permanent negotiation forum, it 
produces a constant stream of independent decisions that allow us to discern the effects of 
national elections on the dynamics of international negotiations statistically. At the core 
of this article is a survival analysis of more than 14,000 proposals for EU legislative acts 
that were introduced in the period 1976-2006. On the basis of these data, we evaluate the 
relationship between pending national elections and the chances of concluding a 
negotiation at the EU level. To preview our results, we find that the chances of reaching 
an agreement are significantly reduced when a national election is pending, and that this 
effect is especially pronounced in the case of close elections in large member states. 
Our focus on EU politics has other significant advantages as well as some drawbacks. 
Because the dynamics of EU decision-making is a well-scrutinized phenomenon in 
international politics, this case permits us to control for a host of factors that have proved 
relevant in previous research, and to exclude confidently alternative explanations that 
would be more plausible in less formalized negotiation contexts. This last point, however, 
also limits the generalizability of some of our results. For example, given that the vast 
majority of legislative proposals in the EU do become law at some point, the inferences 
we draw are about the chances of concluding international agreements at a time of 
national elections compared to periods of time with no elections, and are not about the 
chances of reaching an international agreement per se. More specifically, our dependent 
variable is the hazard of adoption, that is, the probability of a legislative proposal being 
adopted after a given number of days, conditional on it not having been adopted before.  
The conclusion discusses the generalizability of our results and potential avenues for 
future research in more detail. At this point we highlight the more general theoretical and 
substantive importance of our research. First and foremost, we hope to demonstrate the 
fruitfulness of an important research agenda on the intersection of national and 
international politics. This study joins a nascent literature on the dynamic aspects of this 
interaction, focusing on its time-variant characteristics. With a specific focus on pending 
elections, it seeks to push the black box of domestic politics open yet further in order to 
unpack the various ways in which national democratic politics affects international 
relations. 
In substantive terms, a systematic decrease in the chances of adoption suggests a 
systematic slowdown in cooperation and, consequently, opportunity costs in the form of 
foregone economic growth or a delayed provision of international public goods. Our 
findings indicate that the magnitude of the effect of close national elections is, under 
certain conditions, greater than the effect of the formal decision rule (majority voting 
versus unanimity), which has featured prominently in previous studies. This suggests that 
a careful timing of international negotiations outside of national election cycles could be 
as important for cooperation to succeed as is the setting in which these negotiations take 
place. At the same time, a better understanding how international decisions respond to 
national elections also promises to advance normative debates about the legitimacy of 
international institutions and their responsiveness to national democratic politics. 
The article begins with a review of the literature on the relationship between pending 
national elections and international politics. It subsequently proposes how political 
uncertainty during national elections can systematically affect the dynamics of 
international negotiations. Using a survival analysis of EU decision-making, we then 
evaluate whether or not close elections reduce the chances of arriving at a decision at the 
international level. The conclusion discusses the implications of our findings, their 
generalizability, and potential avenues for further research. 
 
Pending national elections and the dynamics of international negotiations in the 
literature 
There is hardly any disagreement in the field of International Relations about the 
importance of domestic factors for international politics. However, the majority of studies 
on the role of national elections for international politics are static in the sense that they 
probe the effect of time-invariant variables, such as different electoral systems.5 The 
nascent literature that adopts a more dynamic approach typically focuses on voter 
preferences and the domestic change that election are expected to bring about.6 In this 
regard, we make a broad distinction between studies following models of political budget 
cycles and studies based on the logic of two-level bargaining. As we shall see, both 
                                                
5 Grossman and Helpman 2005, Rickard 2010, Rogowski and Kayser 2002 
6 More dynamic approaches include studies on the relationship between the mobilization of domestic 
interests and the onset of trade disputes during election years (Chaudoin 2014, Pervez 2015). Other studies 
look at how regime types affect the stability of international commitments and the onset of trade disputes, 
in response to changes in domestic coalitions and leadership turnover (See, e.g., Leeds, et al. 2009, 
Rosendorff and Smith 2015). Our study differs from this literature in at least three aspects. First, we are 
more interested in the uncertainty surrounding elections than the changes that elections are expected to 
bring about. Second, we are interested in the chances of entering commitments during election time, as 
opposed to keeping commitments. Third, our focus is on different types of democratic elections (close races 
versus non-close races), not elections or regime types per se. 
models remain largely indeterminate and, therefore, fail to render clear predictions about 
the chances of reaching international agreements during election time. 
The literature on political budget cycles assumes that as elections approach politicians 
become increasingly concerned about appearing competent to voters.7 On Election Day, 
however, voters have only limited information at hand to evaluate the incumbent’s 
performance. The incumbent uses this temporary information advantage to manipulate 
easily observable performance indicators, such as taxes and government spending, in 
order to enhance her chances of reelection.8 The result is political budget cycles that 
distort government spending toward projects of high visibility and popularity. By 
implication, governments are said to be more likely to take less popular decisions in the 
period right after the election.9 Politicians with less discretion over easily manipulable 
economic variables have been found to time elections in such a way as to take advantage 
of high levels of political support during good economic times.10 
The logic of the political budget cycle model potentially pertains to electorally salient 
international issues as well, although there are surprisingly few studies that adopt such a 
dynamic approach when compared to the wealth of theory and evidence in comparative 
politics. Applying the political budget cycle model to Latin American exchange rate 
regimes, Frieden and colleagues find that governments shy away from undertaking 
corrective but potentially unpopular devaluations right before national elections.11 
Similarly, Stone shows that governments facing elections prefer to wait until after 
                                                
7 Nordhaus 1975, 184. 
8 Rogoff 1990, 24, Rogoff and Sibert 1988, 6. 
9 Beckmann and Godfrey 2007. Cf. Martin 2004. A similar effect exists in federal systems (Seemann 2008, 
263). 
10 Kayser 2006, 447, 2005, 23. 
11 Frieden, et al. 2000, 32-33. Similarly, Stein and Streb 2004, 133-134. 
Election Day to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to avoid electoral 
accountability for the short-term pain of reforms.12 
A second way in which upcoming national elections potentially affect the dynamics of 
international negotiations is through their effect on the incumbent’s bargaining power. As 
Putnam points out in his work on two-level games, constraints on what a government can 
reasonably be expected to push through at home (win-set) may strengthen its bargaining 
power at the international level.13 This implies that if a pending international agreement is 
deeply unpopular at home, a government facing reelection should gain in bargaining 
power compared to a situation in which the elections were to take place further in the 
future. Rickard and Caraway find supporting evidence for this proposition, showing that 
IMF loans negotiated with democratic countries facing imminent elections are less likely 
to contain stringent labor conditions than those negotiated with democratic governments 
facing elections further in the future.14 This can be expected to create incentives for 
incumbents to time international decisions carefully in order to maximize their 
international bargaining power. They accelerate decisions on issues that appear unpopular 
at home in order to exploit their boost in bargaining power during election time, and they 
postpone a more popular decision in order to avoid having to negotiate with diminished 
bargaining power.15 
The two models of political budget cycles and two-level bargaining suggest two 
diametrical ways in which pending elections create incentives for incumbents to 
                                                
12 Stone 2008, 607. 
13 Putnam 1988, 440. 
14 Rickard and Caraway 2014, 707, 710. 
15 Putnam 1988, 452. Rickard and Caraway (2014, 712) find no evidence for strategic timing in the case of 
the IMF. 
manipulate the timing of an international agreement. However, both models remain 
indeterminate insofar as the government’s incentive to either postpone or advance an 
issue in both models depends on additional variables, such as the issue’s electoral 
salience as well as its popularity among voters and the actors that make up the domestic 
win-set. Moreover, incentives alone cannot determine the timing of a decision, since the 
conclusion of international negotiations also depends on the government’s interaction 
with its negotiating partners. 
Under what conditions would negotiating governments alter the timing of an international 
agreement when one of them faces reelection? We can identify two types of arguments in 
the literature. The first and less systematic type of argument looks at the precise 
constellation of preferences at the national and international level. It stands to reason that 
a negotiating partner who shares the preferences of the government facing election would 
support a timing of a decision that increases the incumbent’s bargaining power. The same 
partner would seek a decision before Election Day when she suspects that a change in 
government will lead to a policy stance at greater distance from hers.16 Given that 
international agreements are ultimately collective decisions, the precise timing of their 
conclusion would therefore depend on a host of contingent factors, including the precise 
constellation of preferences at the national and the international level, as well as the 
decision rule and the governments’ relative bargaining power. Consequently, this type of 
argument fails to generate clear predictions about how an incumbent’s preference for a 
specific timing might translate into variation in the chances of concluding an international 
agreement during election time. 
                                                
16 Hawkins, et al. 2006, 19-20, Moravcsik 2000, 225-229. 
The second argument is more systematic and considers repeated rather than one-shot 
negotiations. Studying EU budget negotiations, Christina Schneider shows that member 
governments facing elections receive a disproportionate share of transfers compared to 
governments that do not face elections. She argues that this is because EU governments 
help one another appear competent to their national electorates in the expectation that 
they will receive the same favor when they come up for reelection.17 The same reciprocal 
logic can be expected to apply to an incumbent’s preferences for a specific timing. The 
theory would predict that all governments facing elections are granted special discretion 
over the precise timing of an international decision. 
In summary, the literature on the relationship between pending national elections and the 
chances of reaching an international agreement can be divided into classes of theories 
that either seek to explain the incumbent’s incentive for a specific timing (political 
budget cycle and two-level bargaining models) or that explain why the negotiating 
partners go along with the manipulation of the timing of a decision. They remain 
indeterminate insofar as the incentives for postponement or acceleration depend on a host 
of scope conditions: both models about the incumbent incentives presume the issue to be 
electorally salient, and the precise direction of the proposed effect moreover depends on 
the popularity of the issue at home. Neither model explains how these incentives translate 
into variation in the chances of reaching an agreement in interaction with international 
partners. Judged from the state of the literature, the causal link between pending elections 
and the chances of reaching an international agreement therefore remains ambiguous. 
                                                
17 Schneider 2013, 471. 
The following section takes a step back from these models that are based on tangible 
voter reactions and expected domestic changes in response to the election. Instead, we 
focus on a more fundamental aspect of democratic elections, namely the political 
uncertainty they induce in the period before Election Day. Our objective is to offer a 
more direct and systematic link between elections and international cooperation. 
 
Political uncertainty and the dynamics of international negotiations 
At their core, competitive elections create some positive probability that the incumbent 
will lose office.18 In the following we argue that this political uncertainty, which we 
approximate with the closeness of an electoral race, systematically limits the chances of 
reaching an international agreement. Specifically, we suggest that close national elections 
create incentives for incumbents to remain ambiguous on a wide range of issues out of 
fear that their decision at the international level might contradict their electoral stance at 
the domestic level. This ambiguity, under certain circumstances, inhibits progress in 
international negotiations.19 
Ideally, competitive elections serve to reveal information about the candidates’ policy 
position in order to allow voters to make an informed decision. In reality, as Downs 
observed, candidates often “becloud their policies in a fog of ambiguity.”20 In a seminal 
contribution, Shepsle models this ambiguity as a lottery over a range of positions instead 
of a single point on a policy dimension, and he shows formally that candidates may, 
                                                
18 On political uncertainty as a defining feature of democracies see, e.g. Przeworski 1991, 13, Roemer 
2001, 38. On political uncertainty in the EU, see Kleine 2013. 
19 We thank Jeff Frieden for a fruitful discussion of this idea. 
20 Downs 1957, 136. 
under certain conditions, have an incentive to obfuscate their true position.21 In the 
extreme case of ambiguity, a range of positions over the entire policy spectrum is 
equivalent to candidates taking no position at all. One might object that voters see 
through this strategy and are consequently repelled by it. However, a survey experiment 
by Tomz and Van Houweling finds that ambiguity does not repel and may even attract 
voters.22 
We assume that candidates face a trade off between taking a position that maximizes their 
chances of getting reelected and one that more closely matches their privately known true 
policy preference.23 This trade off may take various forms: the incumbent may be torn 
between the catch-all position of her party and the interests of her own constituency, or 
caught between the interests of the median voter and the interests of an important interest 
group. If voters knew the candidates’ true position, they would not believe her pre-
electoral policy announcements and she would be locked into a losing position.24 Alesina 
and Cukierman model the consequences of this dilemma for the informational efficiency 
of electoral politics.25 They demonstrate that incumbents facing this trade off will tend to 
choose an ambiguous compromise between the ideal and the challenger’s position in 
order to fuzz their true preferences and thus avoid being locked into a position that 
weakens their chances of reelection.26 
                                                
21 Shepsle 1972, 565-7. See also, e.g., Glazer 1990, 240, Meirowitz 2005, 110. 
22 Tomz and Van Houweling 2009, 94. Similarly, Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 1997. 
23 Alesina and Cukierman 1990, 831. By assuming that candidates are torn by different motivations at the 
same time, Alesina and Cukierman build on a wider literature in political economy (Strøm 1990) that 
distinguishes between parties seeking votes, office, or policy. 
24 Alesina 1988, 796. 
25 Although they are interested in ambiguity in the choice of policy instruments, Alesina and Cukierman 
(1990, 831) regard their model as a modification and generalization of Shepsle’s model of ambiguity in 
policy positions. 
26 Alesina and Cukierman 1990, 841, 845. 
This electoral dynamic at home is the backdrop of international negotiations. An 
incumbent engaged in an international negotiation will seek to avoid signals that might 
counteract her electoral stance in the national election. For the sake of simplicity, we 
assume that agreeing to an international decision forces the incumbent to adopt a clear 
stance that is observable to everyone. As we shall see, this assumption is fully plausible 
in the case of the EU where there is little room for secrecy. Thus, the decision not to veto 
an agreement on the liberalization on, say, wine could cast doubts on the incumbent’s 
more general protectionist stance.  
The fact that international decisions might counteract the incumbent’s electoral strategy 
has consequences for the chances of reaching an agreement at the international level, 
even if the bulk of issues is of lesser salience and not immediately decisive for the 
election outcome. As the domestic electoral race gets closer and every single vote counts, 
it becomes more and more important for the incumbent to sacrifice the conclusion of 
international agreements on terms that more closely reflect her true preferences when this 
risks locking her into a losing position at home.27 She therefore increasingly avoids 
taking a specific stance on an ever larger number of mundane international agreements.  
The lack of clear stance on an international agreement matters for the conclusion of its 
negotiations especially when the government in question is a large state. Large states 
represent larger economies and a greater number of sectors; consequently they are more 
essential to the conclusion of a multitude of international agreements. However, if the 
government of a large state is not ready to adopt a clear position on the issue under 
negotiation, the talks cannot proceed and have to be postponed until after the election. 
                                                
27 Similarly, Pervez (2015, 271) argues that leaders become more concerned about electoral margins when 
the ruling party controls a smaller share of the government than when they already control power. 
Note that this argument differs from the political budget cycle model in that it is about 
international issues that are not themselves subject to electoral competition. However, 
they matter for the election outcome insofar as they risk counteracting the candidate’s 
domestic stance. Our argument is therefore more general in that it offers an explanation 
for why domestic elections matter even more mundane issues that are not directly 
electorally decisive. It also differs from the standard two-level bargaining model in the 
sense that rather than placing the negotiating government’s in a strategically 
advantageous position between two parallel games, the incumbent’s position at the 
international level risks undermining its electoral strategy at home. 
The empirical implications of our argument are twofold. First, the closer the electoral 
race at the national level, and the more incumbents are pushed toward avoiding a 
potentially contradictory stance on a wider range of international issues, the lower the 
chances of reaching an agreement at the international level. Second, the larger the 
country where the election takes place, the stronger is the negative effect of close 
electoral races. Note that both implications stand in contrast to a pure reciprocity-based 
argument about governments helping one another look competent in the eyes of the voter. 
Apart from the fact that reciprocity does not in itself predict whether the incumbent 
would prefer to accelerate or delay a decision, reciprocity would also not make this effect 
conditional on the size of the member state or the closeness of the electoral race. 
 
Additional explanations outside the EU context: resources and credible commitment 
The literature review already demonstrated that existing theories on pending domestic 
elections fail to generate clear predictions about the chances of reaching international 
agreements. However, there are two alternative explanations that, in some negotiation 
settings, could account for one or both of the observable implications outlined above. 
Because they are of little plausibility in the EU context, we mention them here and then 
discuss in more detail in the conclusion how changes in the negotiation setting bring 
alternative arguments and promising paths for future research to the fore. 
In the resource-based argument, winning a close election crucially depends on a 
candidate’s costly effort to mobilize support. Since time and budgets are limited, 
incumbents engaged in a tight electoral race find it necessary to shift their time and 
attention from executive functions to campaigning.28 Thus, as the race narrows and the 
incumbent shifts all available resource to the campaign trail, negotiations get bogged 
down, especially if the government in question is crucial to the conclusion of the 
agreement. In the EU, however, the bulk of negotiating takes place among government 
officials, not politicians. Since their time and resources cannot be easily redirected to the 
campaign trail, we consider this argument more relevant in the context of high-level 
talks.29 
Another argument examines the credibility of commitments when the electoral race is 
tight. It appears reasonable that negotiating partners may hesitate to conclude an 
agreement with a government that might be voted out of office, when it is expected that 
                                                
28 In a version of this argument, Page (1976, 748) suggests that ambiguity reflects the fact that candidates 
devote their attention to issues that will get the most votes. In times of highly professional electoral 
campaigns, however, we find it implausible that candidates would be too busy form and voice an informed 
opinion about an issue. 
29 Kleine 2013, 89-99. The involvement of elected national politicians in EU legislation is mainly limited to 
the formulation of guidelines and the official adoption of agreements. Ministers that are unavailable may 
also ask the country’s permanent representative, a cabinet colleague or a minister from a different country 
to act as her proxy. Council of the EU, Rules of Procedure, Article 4. 
this turnover in leadership will lead the new government to unravel the deal.30 In the case 
of the EU, however, there is little risk that a decision, once adopted and published, will 
unravel. As discussed further below, this is because EU law has “direct effect,” meaning 
that decisions become the law of the land even before they are transposed into national 
law, and domestic courts can enforce them as such. In many other contexts, however, 
where international agreements require domestic ratification to become effective or are 
difficult to enforce on the ground, the argument about credible commitments would be a 
plausible alternative explanation. 
 
Analysis 
The EU is an ideal laboratory to explore the relationship between pending national 
elections and the dynamics of international negotiations. As a permanent negotiation 
forum, it produces a constant stream of independent decisions that allows us to evaluate 
our conjectures about the importance of electoral uncertainty statistically. For that 
purpose, we build on previous analyses of the duration of legislative decision-making in 
the EU, in particular an excellent, and so far the most comprehensive, study by Robin 
Hertz and Dirk Leuffen (henceforth HL).31 Before we turn to the statistical analysis, 
however, we provide a brief stylized description of the EU’s legislative process and 
discuss how it compares to other international negotiation settings. 
 
A stylized description of the EU’s legislative process 
                                                
30 However, there is evidence that the effect of leadership turnover on commitments is lower in 
democracies than in autocracies (Leeds, et al. 2009). 
31  Hertz and Leuffen 2011. 
The European Commission, the EU’s principal supranational bureaucracy, has the 
exclusive right to set the agenda with a legislative proposal. The legislative process is 
therefore exogenously initiated with the publication of the Commission’s proposal for an 
EU law.32 The Council of Ministers, which is composed of representatives from all 
member governments, may then adopt the Commission’s proposal with a majority or 
unanimity, depending on the legal base of the proposal. It may reject or change it only if 
it is able to achieve unanimity. In reality, the Council typically refers the legislative 
proposal to government officials in permanent committees and working groups in order 
to resolve as many controversies as possible before the text is discussed among the 
ministers. As in other international negotiation settings, the pace and duration of these 
deliberations lies in the control of the member governments. 
Another difference between decentralized bargaining and the EU’s legislative process is 
the involvement of the European Parliament (EP). In many of the earlier observations in 
our dataset, the EP was merely consulted in this process. Over time, however, the 
member states promoted the now directly elected assembly to a legislative actor on a 
formally equal footing with the Council of Ministers. In contrast to the discussions in the 
Council and its substructure, deliberations in the EP are officially subject to strict 
deadlines within which the parliament has to come up with a position. The EP has 
therefore little discretion over the pace and duration of the negotiations, although it is 
                                                
32 It might be argued that the Commission times the introduction of proposals strategically, not 
independently of national elections. If it did, this effect would work against our argument (if the 
Commission introduced fewer proposals ahead of an election) and reduce the magnitude of our results. We 
tested this proposition empirically in a model presented in Table A17 in the appendix. 
worth noting that, in reality, the legislative actors typically conclude their deliberation 
without exhausting all legislative stages.3334 
Compared to decentralized bargaining settings, negotiations in the EU context are 
therefore highly formalized and involve supranational actors with power over the 
legislative agenda and the final outcome. Nevertheless, the authority over the conclusion 
of the legislative process lies largely in the hands of the member governments and their 
officials. The involvement of these many actors means that it is notoriously difficult to 
keep secrets in the EU. Although arguably less common in international bargaining,35 
complete information is therefore a standard assumption in this context. Once adopted, 
EU law officially has direct effect and bestows rights and obligations on EU governments 
and citizens at the moment of publication. In contrast to some international law, EU law 
therefore is directly effective and domestic courts can enforce it even if it is not 
transposed into national law.36 
 
The dependent variable: adoption hazard 
We want to know if pending close national elections systematically decrease the chances 
of reaching an agreement in the EU. Thus, although we essentially replicate previous 
analyses of the length of EU decision-making, our focus differs from this work in that we 
are more interested in how certain periods in time alter the chances of a conclusion, rather 
than the total duration, of international negotiations. Despite our distinct focus on the 
                                                
33 Kleine 2013, 79-84, 103-105. 
34 Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 280. 
35 Cf. Evans 1993. 
36 This is due to the cumulative effect of two doctrines, the doctrine of “direct effect” and the doctrine of 
“supremacy.” For a discussion of the EU’s legal regime and a comparison with other dispute resolution 
settings see Keohane, et al. 2000, 467. 
timing of decisions, our analysis must also consider the main explanations of the duration 
of the EU’s legislative process. 
We add new variables capturing periods of time immediately preceding national elections 
in the EU member states to a model of decision-making duration, along with other 
variables that influence the timing of decisions. The main advantage of this research 
approach is that it demonstrates that our argument has important and previously 
unrecognized implications for a relatively well-scrutinized phenomenon in international 
politics. 
 
Identifying the time period before close elections 
To test our argument, we identify close and non-close elections in EU member states. We 
gathered data on all national elections in twenty-seven EU member states in the period 
1976-2009. Of all the current member states, only Croatia is excluded from the analysis, 
as it did not become a member until 2013. During this 33-year period, there were 139 
national elections in the remaining twenty-seven EU member states between their 
respective accessions (or January 1976, if earlier) and July 2009. We collected election 
dates and results from the ministries of interior websites of the respective countries when 
available and cross-checked this data against the Parliament and government composition 
database (ParlGov).37 
We are interested in the behavior of candidates and negotiating partners when they are 
uncertain about the outcome of an upcoming national election. Our key variable of 
                                                
37 Döring and Manow 2012. 
electoral uncertainty is distinct from the competitiveness of electoral systems, in that it 
refers more narrowly to the closeness of each race than the system as such. We define a 
close election as an election in which the largest party’s popular vote share was less than 
five points ahead of the second largest party. Fifty-eight of the 139 elections fall under 
this definition of close elections. We take the two months (60 days) prior to the date of 
these narrowly won elections as our measure of the period before close elections. The 
results are likely to be affected somewhat by our operationalization of this period. Below 
we consider the robustness of our results for different lengths of time prior to elections. 
Our measure of closeness requires further justification. One might object that a 
retrospective measure does not quite capture the uncertainty before an election. While we 
agree that a prospective measure would be preferable, we believe that our measure is 
appropriate for empirical and theoretical reasons. The empirical reason is that we ran a 
regression with a continuous variable based on the most recent and complete poll data set 
available.38 The measure we constructed captures the fact that there is no uncertainty in 
periods of time long before electoral campaigns start, and that electoral uncertainty then 
varies continuously over time, as the date of the election draws nearer. The results, 
presented in Table A1 in the appendix, confirm the findings in our main regression.39 
The theoretical reason has to do with the fact that it is common knowledge, among 
academics and politicians, that polls are highly volatile.40 In this light, it seems 
implausible that politicians would update their beliefs about their electoral fortunes with 
every new poll that is published. Instead, it is plausible to assume that politicians enter 
                                                
38 Jennings and Wlezien 2016. 
39 We also ran regressions using a binary variable based on poll data (Table A2 and A3 in the appendix). 
40 Gelman and King 1993. 
the race with a fixed expectation about their chances and signal their position 
accordingly. Considering in addition that the analysis using a continuous measure based 
on polls did not yield substantially different results, it seems reasonable to assume with 
Gary Cox that a measure based on actual election results does estimate pre-election 
beliefs correctly on average.41 Given the lack of consistent voting intention data available 
for all countries, we prefer using this more complete measure, based on actual election 
results, to an incomplete measure based on poll data. 
Another potential objection to our measure of closeness is that it is difficult to compare 
across electoral systems. One might argue, for example, that the margin between the first 
and second party is more appropriate in majoritarian two-party systems than in multi-
party systems of proportional representation where elections often result in coalition 
governments. While we readily concede that detailed analyses of each party’s coalition 
prospects and pledges might offer a more accurate measure, it is not obvious that this 
problem creates systematic bias. First, there is little evidence that pre-electoral alliances 
are credible, common and decisive. Given that multi-party systems typically offer more 
than one potential alliance between ideologically adjacent parties, all parties have an 
incentive “to keep their options open.”42 Second, Kayser and Lindstädt show that when a 
plurality party is replaced in parliament it is almost always by the (formerly) second 
biggest party.43 The margin between the two biggest parties is therefore an appropriate 
indicator for the closeness of the electoral race, even in systems of proportional 
representation. 
                                                
41  Cox 1988, 769.  
42 Golder (2005, 657) shows that only a fraction of pre-electoral alliances in systems of proportional 
representation ever materialize. 
43 Kayser and Lindstädt 2015, fn 12. 
With respect to two-round elections (including France, Hungary and Lithuania), we take 
the results of the final second round. However, there may be considerable uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of the first round but less uncertainty in the second round. This 
was the case, for instance, in the 2002 French election, which ended in a resounding 
second-round victory for Chirac over Le Pen after a narrow first-round outcome in favor 
of Chirac. Cases like this create bias against our argument, since they limit variation on 
our independent variable and may therefore lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the 
proposed causal effect. The opposite is true for cases in majoritarian systems where, 
depending on the geographical distribution of votes, a narrow margin in the popular vote 
can turn into a large parliamentary majority. This was the case in the UK election of 
2005, the only UK election in the 30-year period of our dataset we describe as close. This 
discussion highlights the importance of considering the effects of close elections in 
different countries separately. Table A4 in the appendix shows the effect of close and 
non-close elections for each country. Additional robustness checks consider different 
country-specific measures of closeness. 
Our main analysis groups elections according to the population size of the state in which 
they took place. In particular, we distinguish between elections in large states, which 
include Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain, and elections in smaller states, which 
include all twenty-two other members. This approach makes the results easier to interpret 
and allows for a straightforward test of our conjecture that electoral uncertainty matters 
more in the case of large than small states. Robustness checks presented in Table A5 and 
A6 in the appendix also consider different measures of country size and bargaining 
power. 
 Control variables 
Existing explanations of the duration of EU decision-making have considered the effects 
of variables relating to the general context in which decision-making took place, as well 
as variables relating to the specific legislative proposals under investigation. 
Contextual variables account for variation in the duration of decision-making over time. 
Existing research arrives at different conclusions regarding the impact of EU enlargement 
on the speed of decision-making. While Golub argues that enlargement accelerates 
decision-making by creating a larger number of potential winning coalitions,44 König and 
HL object to this analysis, arguing instead that the addition of more states increases 
transaction costs and therefore produces the opposite effect.45 
Another relevant contextual variable is the size of the backlog of pending proposals.46 
The reasoning is that a large backlog of proposals leads to pressure on decision makers to 
reduce the duration of decision-making in order to decrease the size of the backlog. 
Business in Brussels grinds to a halt in August and we therefore expect few proposals to 
be adopted in this summer month. It is particularly important to control for this 
peculiarity of EU politics since 13 of the 58 close national elections we identified were 
held in September or October (German Bundestag elections are usually held in 
September). Without controlling for the August effect, we would not know if our findings 
are the result of electoral uncertainty or due to the fact that that a considerable part of the 
election campaigns fell in the month of August. 
                                                
44 Golub 2007. 
45 König 2007. 
46 Golub 1999, 2007. 
Proposal characteristics account for variation in the duration of decision-making among 
legislative proposals that are pending at any given point in time. Among the relevant 
proposal characteristics, we expect proposals subject to the qualified majority voting 
(QMV) rule to be decided on more quickly than those subject to unanimity. With regard 
to the involvement of the EP, existing research generally agrees that expanding the 
powers of the EP beyond mere consultation increases the duration of decision-making, 
and we therefore control for this too.47 
In line with existing research, we also control for the type of instrument proposed by 
including a dichotomous variable that distinguishes directives from regulations and 
decisions. Directives are generally more politically salient proposals that involve higher 
domestic adjustment costs than regulations or decisions, notwithstanding the importance 
of many regulations and decisions. Existing studies generally find that directives take 
longer to process than regulations and decisions.48 
 
Analysis 
We base our analysis on a dataset assembled by HL, which they collated using the main 
databases for monitoring EU legislative procedures, PreLex and EURLex. The dataset we 
use contains information on 14,396 legislative proposals that were introduced in the 
period 1976-2006, including directives, regulations and decisions. It also contains 
information on the key explanatory variables from the existing literature relating to the 
legislative procedures and numbers of member states involved. This long time period 
                                                
47  Golub 1999, 743, Schulz and König 2000, 657. 
48  Schulz and König 2000, 657. 
makes it possible to test the effects of close elections, while controlling for the other 
factors we know are relevant. After recoding for time-varying covariates, we have 
326,458 episodes: periods of time within the duration of a proposal separated by changes 
in the values of some independent variables. Our main explanatory variables are time-
varying covariates that take a value of 1 during periods of 60 days prior to an election and 
0 during any other period. We created four such variables corresponding to close 
elections in large states, close elections in small states, non-close elections in large states 
and non-close elections in small states. A new episode is created every time these 
variables change value. 
Our dependent variable is the hazard of adoption: the probability of a proposal being 
adopted (or rejected or withdrawn) after a given number of days, conditional on not 
having been adopted up to that point. The number of days between the introduction of the 
proposal and the adoption (or in a few cases rejection or withdrawal) of the legislative 
proposal is what is referred to as “time at risk.” The start of a period of interest 
corresponds to the date of adoption of a proposal by the Commission and its transmission 
to the Council or to the EP, as recorded in the EUR-Lex webpage. The total number of 
days in our analysis is 5,936,931.49 
We implement a Cox regression incorporating time-varying covariates. We first ran a 
Cox model without interactions between our explanatory variables and time, thereby 
assuming that the effects of these variables are proportional over time. We then ran the 
                                                
49 Because our independent variables can vary over a more regular basis in response to different dates of 
elections in different countries, we prefer an analysis using days as the unit of analysis in order to capture 
these finer variations and make the most complete use of available variation in the data. However, we also 
ran a regression using months instead of days as the unit of analysis. The results confirm the statistically 
significant negative effect of close elections in large countries on the duration of decision-making. 
Grambsch and Therneau test, which assesses whether the proportional hazards 
assumption holds on each of our independent variables.50 We introduced interactions with 
the log of time for the variables for which the proportional hazards assumption could be 
rejected (p<0.05). 
Formally, we run the following regression: 
!"#$%!!!"#!"#!!!!!!"#$!!!! !!!"##!!!! !!!"#$%!!!! !!!"#$$!!!! !!!!
! !!"!!!!!!!"#$!!!! !! !"##!!!! !!!"#$%!!!! !!!"#$$!!!! !!!!!! 
Where: 
t: is the time in days that has elapsed since the introduction of the proposal by the 
Commission. 
h(t): is the hazard of adoption at time t, the probability that the proposal is adopted (or the 
negotiation terminated) at time t conditional on still being negotiated up until t. The 
dataset comprises a variable equal to 1 at the time the proposal is adopted. 
h0(t): is the baseline hazard rate, which is potentially time-varying in a Cox model. 
CELS(t), CESS(t), NCELS(t), and NCESS(t): are dummy variables equal to 1 if t falls 
into a period of 60 days before an election and equal to 0 otherwise. The four different 
variables distinguish between close and non-close elections in large and small member 
states (with close versus non-close and large versus small defined as in the previous 
section). Note that these variables are time-varying and normally change value during the 
time that a proposal is under consideration, since the duration of most proposals is longer 
than 60 days, and since there are periods of time with no elections. 
                                                
50 Grambsch and Therneau 1994. 
X: is a vector of control our variables, including the decision rule, the involvement of the 
EP through cooperation or co-decision, whether the proposal was for a directive, the 
number of member states in the EU during the episode considered, the backlog of 
proposals at the time of the episode, and whether the episode is during the month of 
August. Both the number of member states and the indicator variable for August are 
time-varying, while the other variables are constant within a given proposal. Table 1 
shows the repartition of the elections we consider between close and non-close elections 
and between large and small states, both in terms of number of elections, and in terms of 
the number of episodes they cover. All categories have a reasonable number of elections 
and a fairly balanced coverage of the periods of analysis in terms of number of episodes. 
There is therefore no reason to expect the results to be driven by some outliers in some 
categories. Table 2 summarizes different percentiles of the total duration of proposals, for 
different types of proposals, which can be used as reference points when looking at the 
value of the coefficients at different points in time. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics on main variables 
  
Total number of elections 139 
 Close elections in a large state 17 
 Close elections in a small state 41 
 Non-close election in a large state 29 
 Non-close election in a small state 52 
  
Total number of episodes 326,458 
Number of episodes within 60 days of an election  
 Close elections in a large state 39,983 
 Close elections in a small state 91,276 
 Non-close election in a large state 68,285 
 Non-close election in a small state 113,593 
 All elections 221,242 
  
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics on non-censored proposals 
  Duration (days) 
Type Number Median Standard deviation 
10th 
percentile 
90th 
percentile 
Directives 1,774 597 1,009 106 2,266 
Regulation 8,290 90 577 16 589 
Decision 4,129 141 646 26 790 
All 14,193 118 698 20 902 
 
All these variables (except for qualified majority voting) are interacted with a function of 
time (ln(t)) in order to measure the change in the coefficients over time. We therefore 
report the coefficients’ values at different point in time. These coefficients and the hazard 
ratio they imply are discussed in the text below. 
 
Results 
The results of our main regression are given in Table 3. The main inference we draw 
from this model is that legislative proposals are significantly less likely to be adopted in 
the EU in the months prior to national elections with close outcomes in all member 
states.51 Each of the coefficients are negative and highly significant (p=0.01) at the time a 
proposal is introduced. The data thus supports our main intuition. Even after up to 500 
days following the introduction of a proposal, the effect of close national elections 
remains negative and significantly different from zero for large countries. This indicates 
that the presence of a pending close election in these countries has a negative effect on 
the hazard of legislative proposals being adopted, even after controlling for other 
                                                
51 Table A7 presents the coefficients for all elections (close and non-close) and all countries (large and 
small. 
variables that have previously been found to explain variation in the speed of decision-
making. 
Table 3: The effect of uncertain elections on the duration of decision-making 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days After 500 days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.895*** -0.441*** -0.333*** -0.283*** 
 (0.180) (0.042) (0.053) (0.066) 
in small member states (2) -0.404*** -0.072*** 0.007 0.044 
 (0.100) (0.026) (0.033) (0.041) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.324*** -0.159*** -0.119***  -0.101** 
 (0.108) (0.029) (0.040) (0.049) 
in small member states (4) -0.290*** -0.212*** -0.194*** -0.185*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) 
     
Test of conjecture about size: (1) - (2) -0.491** -0.369*** -0.340*** -0.326*** 
 (0.200) (0.049) (0.063) (0.077) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,121.10    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,961.86    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural 
logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, dummy 
for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, 
dummy for month of August. 
 
 
The exponentiated coefficients express the effects in terms of odds ratios, which are more 
intuitive. The coefficient for close elections in large members (-0.895; exp(-
0.895)=0.409) indicates that the odds of a proposal being adopted are 59 percent lower if 
a close national election is pending in a large state than when there is no election. This 
effect is stronger than for elections in smaller states, for which the odds of a legislative 
proposal being adopted are 33 percent (exp(-0.404)=0.668) lower, and stronger than for 
elections that are not close, for which odds are reduced by 28 percent (exp(-
0.324)=0.723). 
These effects diminish over time for all variables. In particular, while the coefficients for 
close elections in large states remain negative and significant, the coefficients for close 
elections in small states become insignificantly different from zero 300 days after the 
introduction of a proposal. However, at 100 days, which is approximately the median 
decision-making time, all the effects are still negative and significant. These results are 
depicted graphically in Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 1 shows how the relative hazard rate of 
passing a proposal when a certain type of election is about to take place (compared to 
having no such election) differs over time for close versus non-close elections, holding all 
other variables constant, in large states. Figure 2 shows the same relative hazard rates for 
small states. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval around these relative 
hazard rates.52 As suggested by the coefficients shown in Table 3, these relative hazard 
rates are significantly less than 1 for large states over all relevant durations in large states, 
and close elections reduce the hazard of adoption by more than non-close elections. 
These effects diminish over time, but remain negative and significant. For small states, 
the effect of close elections is initially larger than for non-close elections, but this 
difference reverses after a few days into the negotiation process and the effect of close 
elections becomes insignificant. 
  
                                                
52 Note that the null hypothesis with relative hazard rates is 1, not 0. The relative hazard rates are equal to 
the exponential of the combined coefficient!! ! !! ! !! !!"!!!. The bounds of the confidence intervals are 
calculated as the exponential of the bounds of the confidence interval on the combined coefficients, which 
are themselves based on the standard errors calculated as described in note 53 (see Licht 2011 for 
justification). 
Figure 1 [Relative hazard of proposal 
adoption when elections are held in large 
states] 
 
 
Figure 2 [Relative hazard of proposal adoption when 
elections are held in small states] 
 
 
 
 
What is the difference between elections that were close and those that were not close? 
The evidence indicates that close elections in large member states have more significant 
and consistently negative effects on the hazard of adoption than elections that were not 
close. However, for proposals introduced much earlier than the start of these election 
campaigns, the difference in effects becomes smaller. For elections in small states, close 
elections also have a stronger effect than non-close elections when the proposal is 
introduced, but this difference is reversed after 100 days, and non-close elections have a 
larger effect than close elections. Both these effects are smaller in any case than the effect 
of close elections in large member states. All in all, the results regarding the effects of 
elections that were not close in large and small member states are more equivocal than 
those regarding the effects of close elections in those countries. 
The specification presented in Table 3 also allows us to assess differences in effect 
between large and small states. The difference in the coefficients on close elections in 
large and small countries is negative and significantly different from zero.53 Although 
this difference diminishes over time, it is still statistically significant even 500 days after 
the introduction of a proposal. This indicates that our conjecture is strongly supported by 
the data. 
The effects of the control variables (presented in Table A8 in the appendix) are not our 
primary concern. However, they are consistent with previous findings, and as these 
studies recognize the role of these variables in the duration of proposal negotiation, not 
including them could lead to omitted variable bias. The use of QMV in the Council 
significantly expedites decision-making, as does a larger backlog of pending proposals, in 
the early days of a proposal’s negotiation. Consistent with the argument that enlargement 
increases the transaction costs of decision-making, we find that the addition of more 
member states lengthens the decision-making process at the start of a proposal. Similarly, 
involving the EP in a more meaningful way generally lengthens the duration of decision-
making. As expected, proposals are unlikely to be adopted in the month of August. 
 
Robustness checks 
                                                
53  The standard errors are calculated as a linear combination of the standard errors and covariance of the 
two coefficients and the significance results are obtained by using a !2 distribution. 
Because our results could be somewhat affected by the operationalization of the period 
before close elections, we ran our regression using different lengths of this period. The 
results remain substantively unchanged with these alternative measures. The regression 
analysis using one month (30 days) prior to the date of election (Table A9) is presented in 
the appendix. We find similar results using three months (90 days). 
We also constructed different country-specific measures of closeness. Tables A10 and 
A11 of the appendix show the result of regressions in which we defined closeness as the 
margin in vote shares between the top two political parties relative to the country’s 
historical average margins between the top two contenders. One of these measures was 
based on the average of all elections in a given country and another was based on the 
average of all elections prior to the election for which we calculate closeness. In addition, 
we ran regressions using a three-point vote difference as criterion for closeness (Table 
A12 in the appendix) or using a seven-point vote difference. The results of these 
robustness checks are qualitatively similar to our main regression. 
Politicians have been found to time elections strategically in order to capitalize on higher 
levels of political support during good economic times.54 Although very few EU laws 
have the capacity to prompt the dissolution of national governments, snap elections that 
are called before the end of the normal length of the parliamentary term could shorten the 
length of the election campaign and, therefore, the period of electoral uncertainty.55 
During the time-period considered in this article, 68 out of the 139 elections (49%) were 
early elections. We ran our main regression after excluding early elections, and thus kept 
only elections whose timing can be considered exogenous (as fixed by constitutional 
                                                
54 Kayser 2005, 23. 
55 Schleiter and Tavits 2014. Early elections in our analysis include both opportunistic and failed elections. 
rules). The results from this regression are presented in Table A13 in the appendix. The 
coefficients on our main variables are comparable to the ones obtained using all elections. 
Specifically, it remains the case that all elections delay the conclusion of EU 
negotiations, and that close elections in large member states delay decisions by more than 
non-close elections, at the average duration of a proposal, and after excluding early 
elections. 
We ran two additional robustness tests. The first one controls for economic conditions: it 
could be the case that bad economic conditions lead to closer electoral races.56 It is also 
plausible that bad economic times make it harder to reach an agreement at the 
international level when there is more support for protectionism57 and fewer resources 
available to pay off obstinate negotiating partners. The combination of these effects could 
exaggerate the effect of close elections on duration that we find. We ran robustness tests 
using two different measures for economic conditions: 1) a dummy variable that equals 1 
during periods of time when the Eurozone was officially in a recession; 2) the rate of 
GDP growth across the EU in a given year. In both cases, the coefficients of our main 
explanatory variable are scarcely lower at the start of the proposal after the inclusion of 
these variables at all relevant points in time. This suggests that, while recessions and 
slower growth do decelerate the process of proposal adoption, they do not explain away 
the effect of elections. The results and precise descriptions of the measures can be found 
in Tables A14 and A15 in the appendix. We decided not to include these control variables 
in our main regression to make it directly comparable to existing findings. 
                                                
56 Besley and colleagues (2010) explore the link bad economic times and close elections, although they find 
the reverse effect that close elections may adversely affect economic outcomes. 
57 Chaudoin 2014, 878. 
The second test controls for potential ideological conflict among the negotiating partners. 
Such conflicts might slow down the decision-making process, and also be related to the 
closeness of electoral races. We therefore included a variable measuring the range of 
ideological positions between the two most extreme national governments represented in 
the Council. Ideological positions are measured using the so-called RILE index (right-left 
ideological position), based on manifesto analysis. As Table A16 in the appendix shows, 
adding the variable does not significantly alter the coefficients on our key explanatory 
variables.58 
 
Conclusion 
It is far more difficult to reach a decision in the EU in the run up to a close national 
election than when no such national election is pending. For example, prior to a hard-
fought race for the German Bundestag, the chances of adoption are 59 percent lower than 
at other times. Notably, this effect is greater than the effect of the decision rule in the 
Council, i.e. the difference between unanimity and majority voting, which has featured 
prominently in previous explanations of the dynamics of EU negotiations.59 These 
reduced chances of adoption translate into massive opportunity costs, for example, in the 
form of foregone economic growth or a delay in the provision of international public 
                                                
58 The results are not surprising in light of the fact that existing empirical research indicates that there is 
virtually no relationship between governments’ general ideological positions and their positions on specific 
EU issues. Instead, their positions seem to be motivated by specific national and sectoral interests 
(Thomson 2011).  
59 It is common in EU and legislative studies to treat actors’ positions and levels of salience as exogenous 
variables that define the possibilities for package deals and logrolling (see, e.g., Dijkstra, et al. 2008, 
Kardasheva 2013), and to interpret the absence of a clear policy position as indifference or measurement 
error. Our argument about ambiguity implies that indifference is really endogenous to the point in time at 
which the position was measured. 
goods. In fact, pending national elections may in the past have delayed the adoption of 
the total of all EU laws for more than six thousand years.60 
With this study, we hope to have highlighted the fruitfulness of further research into the 
nexus between national and international politics. Although the significance of domestic 
variables for the international level is hardly disputed, the dynamics of this relationship 
have attracted comparatively little attention. Investigating the time-varying effect of 
pending national elections gave us an opportunity to utilize insights from the comparative 
politics literature in order to open up the black box of the relationship between domestic 
and international politics yet further. We discussed how existing arguments about this 
relationship in the domestic context often fail to predict any systematic effect for the 
international level. Against this background, we drew on a debate in American politics 
about the informational efficiency of elections in order to propose a novel argument 
about the role of ambiguity and the conditions under which it affects the chances of 
reaching international agreements. 
We emphasize that there are limits to the generalizability of our results beyond the EU 
context—limits that open up opportunities for further research into the scope conditions 
of the various ways in which the domestic level affects international politics. First, the 
EU is a permanent negotiation forum that produces several hundred decisions per year. 
The bulk of negotiating in the EU therefore takes place among various actors, including 
parliamentarians and numerous national and EU officials. Because of the involvement of 
                                                
60 Calculated as the difference between the inverse of the hazard rate (time to failure, or number of days 
until the proposal is accepted) with close elections in large member states and the inverse of the hazard rate 
with no elections in any state, multiplied by the number of proposals during which there was a close 
national election (4,731 out of a total of 14,396 proposals). The exact number is 6,937 years, to be 
compared with the 16,265 years of analysis time in our dataset. 
this many actors, scholars typically assume a situation of complete information during the 
EU’s legislative process. In negotiation settings where secrets are easier to keep, 
however, we would expect incumbents to feel less compelled to remain ambiguous about 
their true position and enter agreements even in the face of a close election. The 
involvement of officials in contrast to elected politicians in the decision-making process 
also means that EU negotiators are not easily coopted for election campaigning. We 
would expect a diversion of resources from international negotiations to the campaign 
trail to matter more in high-level talks that include elected politicians and political 
appointees rather than regular bureaucrats. In this regard, research could exploit cross-
country variation in political appointees that are more easily swayed from their public 
position to the campaign trail.61 
Second, EU law is highly binding compared to most international law in the sense that it 
does not require additional domestic ratification to become effective and enforceable. 
This makes it highly unlikely that negotiating partners would be reluctant to adopt 
decisions out of fear that a new government might unravel it. We would expect such 
hesitancy to matter more in the case of negotiations of international agreements that are 
less binding. Interestingly, despite its bindingness, our results indicate that EU law is not 
generally used as a tool to lock domestic opponents into an international agreement, in 
which case we would have observed an increase in the chances of reaching agreements 
during close national election campaigns. The likely reason is that commitments to EU 
law are created through a collective decision at the EU level, not a unilateral 
commitment, and therefore require the cooperation of other governments. 
                                                
61 Gualmini (2008, 87) finds that the U.S. public service system features many more political appointments 
and public/private sector mobility than its European counterparts. 
As this discussion of scope conditions and the potential for further research in and outside 
of the EU context indicates, our contribution ought to be understood as a first step of a 
research program about the dynamics between national and international politics. 
Additional steps, most notably the disentanglement of different mechanisms and the 
gauging of their effect in different contexts, are necessary in order to push this agenda 
further ahead. We believe that this is an important endeavor for various reasons. 
First, a better understanding of the ways in which pending elections impair the adoption 
of international agreements could allow decision makers to time negotiations with a view 
to increasing their efficiency. As the example of the EU suggests, the cumulative effects 
of such an exercise could indeed be massive. 
Second, a better understanding of the factors that make the international level more 
responsive to national politics are of utmost importance to debates about the legitimacy 
of global governance. Skeptics demur that the international level lacks responsiveness, 
arguing that international organizations allow executives to circumvent national 
democratic politics.62 Thus, they might interpret our finding of the slowdown of decision-
making in the period prior to close national elections as good news. However, if our 
argument is correct and this responsiveness is a function of ambiguity on the part of the 
candidates, our findings also imply that citizens miss an opportunity to deliberate 
international matters in situations of heightened political attention and are consequently 
unable to endow their government with a meaningful mandate. Ironically, national 
democratic politics is itself a formidable obstacle for the democratic contestation of 
                                                
62 For a conservative version of this argument, see, e.g., Rabkin 2005. 
international politics, which some scholars consider to be a prerequisite for its democratic 
legitimacy.63 
  
                                                
63 Follesdal and Hix 2006, 13, Zürn 2004.  
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Tables and figures for the appendix 
 
Table A1: Duration analysis coefficients with continuous measure of closeness based on poll data 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days After 500 days 
     
Coefficient on closeness index -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.246*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Wald !2 3,150.97    
Log pseudolikelihood -111,388.57    
     
Note: The measure of closeness was constructed as an index equal to 1 minus the difference between the 
voting intentions for the top two parties in the polls in each country, for each of the 60 days preceding an 
election. For days before this period, the index is set equal to zero. The higher the index, the more uncertain 
the election is. Jennings and Wlezien calculate the continuous measure of voting intentions by aggregating 
poll data on days when polls were published, and averaging the two nearest poll publications on days when 
no polls were published. We average this index across countries and run a regression with this index as the 
main explanatory variable. Countries available in their dataset and included in the index are: Austria, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK, Belgium, Denmark and 
Hungary. Not all elections have data available in certain countries. We took the conservative approach of 
coding missing elections as having no uncertainty in the index, which should bias the results against the 
direction we expect, and still obtain significantly negative results. 
 
  
Table A2: Duration analysis coefficients with binary measure of closeness based on poll data for 
large countries 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections -0.501*** -0.501*** -0.501*** -0.501*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
     
Non-close elections -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
     
Wald !2 3,001.18    
Log pseudolikelihood -105,031.21    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Note: This regression includes only elections for large countries for which we have poll data for every 
election in the period 1976-2009 (Germany, France (presidential elections only), and the UK) using the 
difference in voting intentions between the top two parties / candidates, based on the last poll before 
election day. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted 
with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of 
EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for 
directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August. 
  
Table A3: Duration analysis coefficients with binary measure of closeness for all elections, replacing 
measure of closeness with poll data when available 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.598*** -0.423*** -0.382*** -0.362*** 
 (0.168) (0.039) (0.054) (0.067) 
in small member states (2) -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.325*** -0.119*** -0.070* -0.047  
 (0.108) (0.028) (0.039) (0.048) 
in small member states (4) -0.272*** -0.187*** -0.167*** -0.158*** 
 (0.096) (0.024) (0.033) (0.040) 
     
Wald !2 3, 125.96    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,974.75    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Note: This regression includes all elections (the same countries and time period as the main regression 
presented in the paper), but replacing our original measure of closeness by that based on voting intentions 
whenever possible. 
 
 
 
 Table A4:  Duration analysis individual country coefficients  
 
 
Coefficient SE p-value After 100 days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
       
Close elections       
Germany -1.132 0.177 0.000 -1.132 -1.132 -1.132 
France -0.448 0.071 0.000 -0.448 -0.448 -0.448 
UK -0.477 0.158 0.003 -0.477 -0.477 -0.477 
Italy -1.220 0.331 0.000 -0.044 0.236 0.367 
Spain -0.631 0.085 0.000 -0.631 -0.631 -0.631 
Netherlands 0.220 0.178 0.216 -0.116 -0.196 -0.234 
Belgium -0.313 0.059 0.000 -0.313 -0.313 -0.313 
Greece -0.198 0.054 0.000 -0.198 -0.198 -0.198 
Portugal 0.166 0.111 0.137 0.166 0.166 0.166 
Austria -0.338 0.390 0.385 -0.338 -0.338 -0.338 
Denmark -0.131 0.089 0.142 -0.131 -0.131 -0.131 
Finland -0.243 0.090 0.007 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 
Luxembourg -0.407 0.104 0.000 -0.407 -0.407 -0.407 
Poland 0.611 0.189 0.001 0.611 0.611 0.611 
Czech Republic 0.414 0.257 0.107 0.414 0.414 0.414 
Hungary -0.295 0.199 0.138 -0.295 -0.295 -0.295 
Lithuania 27.342 10.628 0.010 9.174 4.840 2.825 
Slovenia -28.493 5.620 0.000 -10.426 -6.116 -4.112 
Latvia 0.147 0.355 0.679 0.147 0.147 0.147 
Cyprus -1.602 0.903 0.076 -0.648 -0.420 -0.315 
Malta -0.531 2.340 0.821 1.132 1.529 1.713 
Romania -11.697 6.100 0.055 -3.625 -1.699 -0.804 
       
Non-close elections       
Germany 0.189 0.240 0.431 -0.201 -0.294 -0.338 
France -0.595 0.182 0.001 -0.349 -0.291 -0.263 
UK 0.548 0.230 0.017 -0.288 -0.487 -0.580 
Italy -1.428 0.286 0.000 -0.266 0.011 0.139 
Spain 0.138 0.068 0.044 0.138 0.138 0.138 
Netherlands 1.070 0.287 0.000 -0.056 -0.324 -0.449 
Belgium -2.077 0.496 0.000 -0.841 -0.546 -0.409 
Greece 0.445 0.434 0.305 -1.414 -1.858 -2.064 
Portugal 0.227 0.284 0.424 -0.224 -0.331 -0.381 
Sweden -0.577 0.141 0.000 -0.577 -0.577 -0.577 
Austria -1.147 0.365 0.002 -0.357 -0.168 -0.080 
Denmark -0.219 0.186 0.238 -0.085 -0.053 -0.039 
Finland -1.077 0.207 0.000 -1.077 -1.077 -1.077 
Ireland 0.079 0.048 0.103 0.079 0.079 0.079 
Luxembourg -1.364 0.297 0.000 0.329 0.734 0.921 
Poland -0.311 0.306 0.309 -0.311 -0.311 -0.311 
Slovakia -0.098 0.191 0.606 -0.098 -0.098 -0.098 
Lithuania -0.309 0.223 0.166 -0.309 -0.309 -0.309 
Slovenia -0.122 0.284 0.667 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 
Estonia -0.813 0.892 0.362 -0.529 -0.461 -0.429 
Cyprus -8.206 3.261 0.012 -3.065 -1.839 -1.269 
Bulgaria -1.774 1.007 0.078 -1.774 -1.774 -1.774 
       
Observations 14,396      
Decision days 5,936,931      
Controls Yes      
Wald !2 3746.61      
Log pseudolikelihood -104,628.25      
       
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with natural 
logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU members, 
dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for directive, size 
of backlog, dummy for month of August. Variables for France and Cyprus include both presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Sweden, Ireland, Slovakia, Estonia and Bulgaria had no close elections between 
their accession to the EU and June 2009. Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Bulgaria 
had no non-close elections between their accession to the EU and June 2009. 
 
 50 
  
 51 
Table A5: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummies interacted with country population 
size 
 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections x country size -0.171*** -0.072*** -0.049*** -0.038*** 
 (0.030) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Non-close elections x country size -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.059*** 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,132.87    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,963.27    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Notes: The regression interacts an election dummy with the log of population size for each 
country separately and then aggregates these values across countries. The population size was 
obtained from Eurostat and changes yearly. Population size correlates with other measures of 
power in EU studies or International Political Economy, such as Council voting weights and 
market size.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted 
with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), 
number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and 
codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.  
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Table A6: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummies interacted with country voting 
weights in the Council 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections x voting weight -0.069*** -0.024*** -0.014*** -0.009* 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Non-close elections x voting 
weight -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,095.20    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,987.01    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Notes: The regression interacts an election dummy with the proportion of Council voting weights 
for each country (in percentage points) and then aggregates these values across countries. The 
Council voting weights were obtained from EU treaties directly and change when new members 
access the EU (in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004 and 2007). The coefficient should be interpreted 
as the effect of one percentage point of voting weight increase, in the countries which have an 
election at a given point in time, on the hazard rate at that point. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted 
with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), 
number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and 
codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August.  
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Table A7: Duration analysis coefficients not broken down by country-size 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections -0.605*** -0.213*** -0.120*** -0.077** 
 (0.093) (0.024) (0.031) (0.038) 
     
Non-close elections -0.422*** -0.208*** -0.157*** -0.133*** 
 (0.082) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) 
     
Wald !2 3,065.99    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,997.95    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates interacted with 
natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting (QMV), number of EU 
members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation and codecision), dummy for 
directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August. 
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Table A8: Main regression with coefficients of control variables 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.895*** -0.441*** -0.333*** -0.283*** 
 (0.180) (0.042) (0.053) (0.066) 
in small member states (2) -0.404*** -0.072*** 0.007 0.044 
 (0.100) (0.026) (0.033) (0.041) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.324*** -0.159*** -0.119***  -0.101** 
 (0.108) (0.029) (0.040) (0.049) 
in small member states (4) -0.290*** -0.212*** -0.194*** -0.185*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) 
     
QMV in council 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 0.443*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Number of EU member states -0.068*** -0.012*** 0.001 0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cooperation with EP -7.752*** -2.134*** -0.794*** -0.171*** 
 (0.385) (0.095) (0.059) (0.068) 
Co-decision with EP -6.136*** -1.678*** -0.615*** -0.120** 
 (0.388) (0.094) (0.045) (0.049) 
Directive -3.885*** -1.197*** -0.556*** -0.258*** 
 (0.213) (0.052) (0.036) (0.042) 
Backlog 0.689*** 0.137*** 0.006 -0.056*** 
 (0.043) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) 
August 1.775*** -2.778*** -3.864*** -4.368*** 
 (0.287) (0.145) (0.219) (0.256) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,121.10    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,961.86    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates 
interacted with natural logarithm of time. Backlog is the number of pending legislative acts 
divided by 100 to ensure that the coefficients are not rounded to zero. 
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Table A9: Duration analysis coefficients with election dummy defined as 30 days prior to election  
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -1.450*** -0.494*** -0.265*** -0.159* 
 (0.276) (0.060) (0.069) (0.088) 
in small member states (2) -0.892*** -0.193*** -0.026 0.052 
 (0.143) (0.035) (0.042) (0.052) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.235 -0.289*** -0.302*** -0.308*** 
 (0.147) (0.039) (0.055) (0.067) 
in small member states (4) -0.249*** -0.194*** -0.180*** -0.174*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
     
Test of conjecture about size: 
(1) - (2) -0.558* -0.301*** -0.240*** -0.211** 
 (0.316) (0.071) (0.083) (0.104) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,133.76    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,955.30    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates 
interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting 
(QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation 
and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August. 
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Table A10: Duration analysis coefficients using average closeness measure (based on elections prior 
to election under consideration) 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
in small member states (2) -0.263*** -0.263*** -0.263*** -0.263*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.436*** -0.157*** -0.091**  -0.060 
 (0.125) (0.033) (0.046) (0.056) 
in small member states (4) -0.144*** 0.023 0.063* 0.081* 
 (0.115) (0.028) (0.038) (0.047) 
     
Wald !2 3, 211.60    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,933.66    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Note: In this model, we looked at the rolling historical average of electoral closeness from the first free 
universal suffrage elections since 1945 until the particular election for which closeness is being calculated. 
Compared to our main regression, it remains the case that close elections have a larger effect on the 
duration of negotiations than non-close elections. Notable differences include the smaller coefficient on 
close elections in large states (compared to the main regression) and the larger effect of non-close 
elections, at the time of introduction. 
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Table A11: Duration analysis coefficients using average closeness measure (based on all elections) 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.426*** -0.385*** -0.375*** -0.371*** 
 (0.134) (0.033) (0.045) (0.056) 
in small member states (2) -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.177*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.416*** -0.146*** -0.081*  -0.051 
 (0.121) (0.032) (0.044) (0.054) 
in small member states (4) -0.072*** -0.124*** -0.137*** -0.142*** 
 (0.111) (0.028) (0.038) (0.047) 
     
Wald !2 3166.40    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,962.46    
     
Note: Because the measure used in the previous model has the downside of having fewer data points, we 
ran another model that used each country’s historical average from the first universal suffrage free 
elections since 1945 until the country’s last election in our data set. Compared to our main regression, it 
remains the case that close elections have a larger effect on the duration of negotiations than non-close 
elections. Notable differences include the smaller coefficient on close elections in large states (compared 
to the main regression) and the larger effect of non-close elections, at the time of introduction. 
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Table A12: Duration analysis coefficients Close election defined as less than 3% difference between 
first two parties 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -1.004*** -0.565*** -0.461*** -0.412*** 
 (0.230) (0.057) (0.073) (0.090) 
in small member states (2) -0.413*** -0.052 0.034 0.074 
 (0.144) 0.034 (0.042) (0.053) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.324*** -0.208*** -0.180*** -0.167*** 
 (0.103) (0.026) (0.037) (0.046) 
in small member states (4) -0.334*** -0.222*** -0.195*** -0.183*** 
 (0.087) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) 
     
Test of conjecture about size: 
(1) - (2) -0.591** -0.513*** -0.494*** -0.486*** 
 (0.268) (0.066) (0.083) (0.103) 
     
Observations 14,396    
Decision days 5,936,931    
Controls Yes    
Wald !2 3,149.15    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,951.13    
     
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Cox regression with time-varying covariates 
interacted with natural logarithm of time. Controls include dummy for qualified majority voting 
(QMV), number of EU members, dummy for cooperation procedure with parliament (cooperation 
and codecision), dummy for directive, size of backlog, dummy for month of August. 
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Table A13: Duration analysis coefficients after excluding early election 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.973*** -0.364*** -0.218*** -0.150* 
 (0.249) (0.054) (0.067) (0.086) 
in small member states (2) -0.518*** -0.082*** 0.021 0.070 
 (0.149) (0.036) (0.043) (0.053) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109***  -0.109*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
in small member states (4) -0.984*** -0.259*** -0.086* -0.005 
 (0.177) (0.040) (0.048) (0.060) 
     
Wald !2 3,002.87    
Log pseudolikelihood -105,016.60    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: A notable difference between this and our main regression is the large and significant coefficient of 
non-close elections in small member states at the introduction of the proposal. However, the magnitude of 
this coefficient decreases rapidly over time and becomes smaller than the coefficient for close elections in 
large member states after 100 days and that for non-close elections in large member states after 300 days. 
The high coefficient at the start of the proposal seems to be a mechanical consequence of the quick 
decrease of the coefficient’s value over time. The quicker decrease suggests that some early non-close 
elections in small states lengthened the duration of negotiation at later stages of the process. Once these 
elections are removed, this effect disappears. The other difference to our main regression is that the effect 
of elections in large member states decreases more quickly when early elections are removed from the 
analysis. However, their effect remains larger than that of other elections up to more than 500 days after 
the start of a negotiation, and therefore applies to most proposals. 
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Table A14: Duration analysis coefficients controlling for recessions 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.808*** -0.418*** -0.325*** -0.282*** 
 (0.183) (0.042) (0.053) (0.067) 
in small member states (2) -0.431*** -0.079*** 0.005 0.044 
 (0.101) (0.026) (0.033) (0.041) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.361*** -0.168*** -0.122***  -0.100** 
 (0.108) (0.029) (0.040) (0.049) 
in small member states (4) -0.279*** -0.209*** -0.192*** -0.184*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) 
     
Period of recession  -0.311*** -0.089*** -0.036 -0.011 
 (0.106) (0.030) (0.041) (0.050) 
     
Wald !2 3,125.62    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,955.15    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Notes: The coefficients of our main explanatory variables are scarcely lower than in our main regression 
after inclusion of this variable at all relevant points in time. This suggests that, while recessions and a 
decreasing growth do slow the process of proposal adoption, they do not explain away the effect of 
elections. 
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Table A15: Duration analysis coefficients controlling for GDP growth 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.323*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
in small member states (2) -0.581*** -0.105*** 0.008 0.061 
 (0.103) (0.026) (0.034) (0.042) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.326*** -0.143*** -0.099**  -0.079 
 (0.109) (0.030) (0.042) (0.051) 
in small member states (4) -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.179*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
     
GDP growth (percentage points) 0.165*** 0.028*** -0.005 -0.020 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) 
     
Wald !2 2,575.78    
Log pseudolikelihood -92,258.47    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Note: In comparison, the coefficients in our main regression are slightly lower at the start of the 
negotiation process after inclusion of this variable but quickly regain levels close to those presented in our 
main regression as the negotiation progresses. 
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Table A16: Duration analysis coefficients controlling range of ideological positions 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction 
After 100 
days 
After 300 
days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** -0.499*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
in small member states (2) -0.397*** -0.061*** 0.020 0.057 
 (0.103) (0.026) (0.035) (0.043) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.219*** -0.202*** -0.198*** -0.196**  
 (0.110) (0.030) (0.043) (0.052) 
in small member states (4) -0.321*** -0.218*** -0.193*** -0.182*** 
 (0.103) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044) 
     
Ideological range 0.004 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Wald !2 3,097.56    
Log pseudolikelihood -102,512.94    
*: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Note: Each government’s measure is itself a weighted average of the RILE measure of the different parties 
represented in the government. It should therefore capture how the ideological disagreements among 
negotiating actors affects the duration of proposals. 
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Table A17: Duration analysis controlling for the Commission’s time in office 
 
 Coefficients 
 
At time of 
introduction After 100 days After 300 days 
After 500 
days 
     
Close elections     
in large member states (1) -0.888*** -0.437*** -0.329*** -0.279*** 
 (0.180) (0.042) (0.053) (0.066) 
in small member states (2) -0.409*** -0.075*** 0.005 0.042 
 (0.101) (0.026) (0.033) (0.041) 
Non-close elections     
in large member states (3) -0.316*** -0.154*** -0.116***  -0.098** 
 (0.108) (0.029) (0.040) (0.049) 
in small member states (4) -0.285*** -0.208*** -0.189*** -0.180*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.034) (0.042) 
     
Commission’s final year? 0.056** 0.056** 0.056** 0.056** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Wald !2 3127.56    
Log pseudolikelihood -104,959.11    
     
Note: We added a variable for the Commission’s time in office. Following theories of legislative time (e.g. 
Döring 1995), this decision is based on the consideration that the pressure to adopt as many laws as 
possible leads to bottlenecks at the end of the legislative term. Since the Commission’s discretion in the 
introduction of new proposals should therefore decrease towards the end of its term, we added a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the time period under consideration is within the last year of term of a 
given commission.  
 
 
 
 
